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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on the global economy and trade, since production
and consumption have been reduced around the world. The production and distribution of
COVID-19 vaccines caused unequal distribution as some developed countries have imposed
export restrictions. As a result, wealthier countries are resuming normalcy, while the rest of the
world continues to struggle to vaccinate its citizens. Article XI(2)(a) of The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade exceptions allow members the legal ability to impose export restrictions
if they meet specific criteria: they must be temporary, confined to foodstuffs and vital products,
and enforced in the context of preventing and easing critical shortages. Export restrictions on
COVID-19 vaccine applied by developed countries appear to meet these criteria, given that all
of these countries are facing a shortage, and the restrictions are being placed to alleviate it.
Responding to this unpleasant measure, this article finds that developing countries may employ
two available alternative measures, namely compulsory licensing and security exceptions under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights to protest unequal distribution of vaccines around the world.
Keywords : Covid-19 vaccines, developing countries, export restrictions, WTO law
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), export
restrictions did not get nearly as much attention as they did when it came to
import restrictions in the past.1 However, the situation has radically shifted
over the last decade, and several countries – particularly natural resource
producers – have imposed taxes, quotas and prohibitions on exports.2 These
actions are being taken for a variety of reasons. The first is due to a shortage of
Stephanie Switzer, Leonardus Gerber and Francesco Sindico, “Access to Minerals: WTO Export Restrictions and Climate Change Considerations,” Laws 4 (2015): 631. https://doi.org/10.3390/
laws4030617
2
Jack Quirk, “COVID-19 and Export Restrictions: The Case for Free Trade,” Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 17, no. 2 (2021): 154. https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol17/iss2/4
1
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natural resources, among other things, by rising global population3 and BRICS
countries’ rapid economic expansion.4 Furthermore, environmental protection5
and the encouragement of downstream industries are crucial justifications for
export limitations.6 Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are also
increasingly issuing export restrictions on specific products. For instance, the
United States implemented export controls to limit the export of petroleum
products and western red cedar, deeming it important to protect domestic
industries.7
Since 2020, export restrictions have been linked to the coronavirus
outbreak. In 2020, 80 nations and customs territories imposed export
restrictions on medical items such as ventilators and face masks.8 After it was
discovered that a Chinese-backed company had transferred these products
from Sydney to Shanghai, Australia imposed export limits on masks, gloves,
gowns, goggles, visors, hand sanitizers, and alcohol wipes.9 In addition to
that, South Korea also placed export restrictions on face masks. This led to
people in South Korea wearing KF-94 (similar to N-95) face masks on the
street, while healthcare workers in Europe became infected with COVID-19
due to a lack of face masks.10
In 2021, export restrictions have affected the distribution of COVID-19
vaccines. Most countries that can produce vaccines impose export restrictions
in order to prioritize the needs of their citizens. For instance, the European Union
(EU) passed Regulation 2021/111, which required an export authorization for
COVID-19 vaccinations.11 This kind of authorization can be delivered only
when the volume of exports do not jeopardize the fulfillment of the Union’s
Advanced Purchase Agreements with vaccine manufacturers, which have
Mark Wu, “China’s Export Restrictions and the Limits of WTO Law,” World Trade Review 16, no. 4
(2017): 674, https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474561700026X
4
Mitsuo Matsushita, “A Note on the Appellate Body Report in the Chinese Minerals Export Restrictions
Case,” Trade Law and Development 4 no. 2 (2012): 401
5
Baris Karapinar, “Defining the Legal Boundaries of Export Restrictions: a Case Law Analysis,” Journal International Economic Law 15, no. 2 (2012): 479. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgs021 [hereinafter
Baris Karapinar,“Defining the Legal Boundaries,”]
6
Bingwan Xiong and Paolo Davide Farah, “Contextualism in WTO Case Law on Mineral Export Restrictions: Puzzles and Implications,” Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 15,
no. 2 (2020): 504.
7
I Gusti Ngurah Parikesit Widiatedja, “Indonesia’s Export Ban on Nickel Ore: Does It Violate the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Rules?” Journal of World Trade 55, no. 4 (2021): 668
8
“WTO Report Finds Growing Number of Export Restrictions in Response to COVID-19 Crisis”, accessed 14 September 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/rese_23apr20_e.htm.
9
“Armed to Respond: Flu Jabs Crucial as Fight Ramps Up,” Herald Sun, 1 April. 2020, 6.
10
Ibid.
11
“Coronavirus: WHO criticises EU Over Vaccine Export Controls,” Accessed 12 December 2021,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55860540. [hereinafter “Coronovirus: WHO criticises EU”]
3
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been negotiated.12 Along the same lines, India imposed COVID-19 vaccine
export restrictions due to the significant impact the virus had on the country.
Despite previous agreements and contracts with international customers, the
government is limiting COVID-19 vaccine exports due to its vital necessity.13
Finally, under the Defense Production Act (DPA), the United States (US) has
imposed export limitations on essential raw materials used in the creation of
COVID-19 vaccines, with the goal of putting domestic distribution first and
the use of COVID-19 vaccines as well as personal protective equipment.14
Export restrictions are ineffective in achieving fair and reasonable policy
goals because they can result in significant domestic and global welfare
losses.15 These kinds of restrictions have dire consequences in the distribution
of COVID-19 vaccines. After eighteen months of the epidemic, about 1.5
billion vaccine doses have been delivered worldwide.16 However, only ten
nations have gotten 75 percent of the vaccines available.17 Only 25 million
vaccine shots have been distributed across the entire African continent, which
has a population of 1.36 billion people.18 While wealthy countries race to buy
enough vaccines to vaccinate their whole population multiple times, many of
the world’s poorest countries struggle to protect their health workers.19 This
enormous vaccine disparity and injustice is not only a moral failing, as WHO
Director Tedros Ghebreyesus had stated, it is also an economic and human
rights disaster, as well as self-defeating.20
Under the WTO, Article XI(2)(a) GATT exceptions allow members to
impose export restrictions if they meet specific criteria: they must be temporary,
confined to foodstuffs and vital products, and enforced in the context of
preventing and easing critical shortages. Export restrictions on COVID-19
vaccines applied by developed countries appear to meet these criteria, given
that they are facing a shortage, and the restrictions are being placed to alleviate
Ibid.
Sara Jerving, “Countries May Stall COVID-19 Vaccinations due to Indian Export Limits,” Accessed
24 October 2021,https://www.devex.com/news/countries-may-stall-covid-19-vaccinations-due-to-indianexportlimits-99548. [hereinafter Sara Jerving, “Countries May Stall COVID-19 Vaccinations.”]
14
Anshu Siripurapu, “What Is the Defense Production Act?” Accessed 7 January 2022, https://www.cfr.
org/in-brief/what-defense-production-act. [hereinafter Anushu Siripurapu, “What is the Defense Produciton Act?”]
15
Baris Karapinar,“Defining the Legal Boundaries,” 480
16
Els Torreele, et al, “Equitable COVID-19 Vaccine Access,” Health and Human Rights Journal 23, no.
1 (2021): 275.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Godwell Nhamo, et. al., “COVID-19 vaccines and treatments nationalism: Challenges for low-income
countries and the attainment of the SDGs, Global Public Health, 16 no. 3 (2021): 320.https://doi.org/10.10
80/17441692.2020.1860249 [hereinafter “COVID-19 vaccines and treatments nationalism,”]
20
Els Torreele, et al, “Equitable COVID-19 Vaccine Access,” Health and Human Rights Journal 23, no.
1 (2021): 276.
12
13
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it. Looking at the current unequal distribution of the vaccines, this paper
analyzes what developing countries can do under the WTO Law to respond to
export restrictions on COVID-19 vaccines.
To begin, this paper denotes a detailed account of the law relevant to export
restrictions under the WTO. It analyzes the WTO judicial decisions, showing
real evidence of the ways in which these laws work. There is also an overview
of export restrictions on COVID-19 vaccines, stating why and how this measure
gets underway. It examines whether this measure is consistent with the WTO
Law. Finally, this paper explains any possible measures of developing countries to
respond to these restrictions.

II. EXPORT RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE GATT 1994 AND
THE WTO JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Export restraints are defined as follows in the WTO Panel Report in the
United States–Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies:
"A border measure that takes the form of a government law or regulation
which expressly limits the number of exports or places explicit conditions
on the circumstances under which exports are permitted, or that takes
the form of a government-imposed fee or tax on exports of the products
calculated to limit the number of exports."21
Export constraints were defined by some analysts as measures put in place
by exporting countries to regulate export flows.22 Export limitations can take
many forms, including taxes, tariffs, and fees, quotas, prohibitions, mandatory
minimum export prices, and stringent export licensing procedures.23 Export
limitations are divided into two categories: economic and non-economic
aims. Economic goals include increasing government revenue, bolstering
downstream businesses, and limiting price volatility.24 Non-economic goals,
on the other hand, include environmental protection and national security.25
Article XI: 1 of the 1994 GATT is the fundamental WTO article pertaining to
quantitative export limits. It explains that:
Panel Report, “United States - Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies,” adopted 23 August
2001, WT/DS194/R, accessed 18 September 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds194_e.htm
22
Jane Korinek and Jessica Bartos, “Multilateralising Regionalism: Disciplines on Export Restrictions in
Regional Trade Agreements,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 139 (2012): 7.
23
Eric W. Bond and Joel Trachtman, “China - Rare Earths: Export Restrictions and the Limits of Textual
Interpretation,” World Trade Review 15, no. 2 (2016): 191. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745615000695
24
Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: WTO
and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2011), 145–146.
25
Dylan Geraets, “Export Restrictions on Critical Minerals and Metals - Testing the Adequacy of WTO
Disciplines,” World Trade Review 16, no. 1 (2017): 149. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745616000422
21
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“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party
[...] on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.”26
In other words, export levies, taxes, and other charges are permitted, but
any other measures limiting the amount of product exports are prohibited.
Bans, quotas, minimum prices, and non-automatic licensing systems are
examples of quantitative measures. Excessive customs fees are prohibited by
Article VIII of the GATT, which pertains to measures imposed in connection
to customs procedures, and fees must not be used to: (i) tax exports for fiscal
purposes; or (ii) provide indirect protection to domestic products.27 Article XI:2
(a) then makes an exemption to Article XI: 1, stating that “export prohibitions
or limitations temporarily applied to prevent or relieve serious shortages of
foodstuffs or other essential products to the exporting contracting party” are
not included.28 The following WTO Judicial Decisions then discussed export
restrictions at length.

A. CHINA – MEASURES RELATED TO THE EXPORTATION
OF VARIOUS RAW MATERIALS
The WTO’s first big case was China – Measures Related to the Exportation
of Various Raw Materials (2011) (China – Raw Materials). The lawsuit
revolved around several violations of the GATT’s Articles XI and XX. 29
The U.S, the E.U, and Mexico filed a WTO case against China for imposing
export limits and levies on raw resources such as bauxite, white phosphorus,
lead, magnesium scrap, manganese scrap, zinc scrap, and silicon carbide.30
When it set export limitations on those materials, China reportedly violated
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) then
investigated whether China’s export restrictions on specific minerals were in
violation of Article XI, or whether Article XX(b) and XX(g) could be used to
justify it.31
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15 Apr. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994), art XI [GATT 1994].
27
Ibid., art. VIII.								
28
Ibid., art. XI:2.
29
Panel Report, “China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,” adopted 22
February 2012, WT/DS394/R; WT/DS395/R; WT/DS398/R, Accessed 17 October 2021, https://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds394_e.htm [hereinafter China Panel Report]
30
Xiong and Farah, “Contextualism in WTO Case Law,” 505.
31
Appellate Body Report, “China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,”
adopted 22 February 2012, WT/DS394/AB/R; WT/DS395/AB/R; WT/DS398/AB/R, Accessed 22 October
2021, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds394_e.htm )[hereinafter China AB Report]
(accessed 24 Jul. 2020)
26

267

I Gusti Ngurah Parikesit Widiatedja

1. Article XI of the GATT 1994
To assess whether China’s measure met the requirements of Article XI:2(a)
of the GATT 1994, the Panel and the AB looked at a number of key terms,
including “temporarily applied”, “to prevent or relieve critical shortages”, and
“foodstuffs or other essential products”.32
a.

“Temporarily” Applied

The AB defined the notion of “temporary” under Article XI:2(a) of the
GATT 1994 as”[l]asting or meant to last for a limited time only; not permanent;
made or arranged to supply a passing need”.33 It reflected a measure taken for
a limited period, a measure taken to channel a “passing need” when it was
related to the word “applied”.34The AB agreed with the panel’s conclusion
in this issue, finding that China did not meet the standards of GATT Article
XI:2(a) because its refractory-grade bauxite export quotas did not appear to
be temporary or targeted at preventing a catastrophic shortage.35 The export
quotas in question, for example, had been in place for roughly ten years at the
time of the dispute, and it appeared that China intended to keep them in place
until their stocks were depleted. 36
b.

Prevent or relieve a “critical shortage”

The AB stated that “critical shortage” referred to “those deficiencies in
quantity that are crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance,
or that reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or a turning point”.37 The
AB also looked at how the types of shortages that followed Article XI:2(a)
were more limited than those that followed Article XX (j).38 The AB used the
phrase “general or local short supply” in Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 to
interpret the term “critical shortage” in Article XI:2(a).39 The AB defined “in
short supply” as “available only in a limited number, scarce” by the AB.40 As
a result, it had the same meaning as the word “shortage”.41
If the scarcity was not temporary, the AB concurred with the panel that
simply banning exports would not be enough to “relieve or prevent” it.42 To
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Ibid., para. 322.
Ibid., para. 323.
Ibid.
Ibid., para. 344.

China Panel Report, para.7.350.
China AB Report, para. 324.
Ibid., para. 325.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
China Panel Report, para.7.351.

268

Export Restrictions on Covid-19 Vaccines

put it another way, the keywords “critical shortage” and “temporarily applied”
were linked. China’s plan was to keep the measure in place indefinitely,
until the anticipated lifespan of 16 years had passed. 43 Hence, it should be
considered something else than a “critical shortage.” As a result, the action
would not be considered “temporarily applied” to prevent or relieve a “critical
shortage,” as specified in Article XI:2 (a).44
c.

“Essential” Products

The term “essential to” was defined by the panel as “absolutely necessary”
and “indispensably requisite”, among other things.45 It was thus deduced that
the relevance of a product should be assessed based on the country’s unique
conditions. As a result, a product may be considered “essential” under Article
XI:2(a) if it was “important”, “necessary”, or “indispensable” to a certain
Member.46 Article XI:2(a) offered a measure of what would be considered
a product “important to the exporting Member” by incorporating the word
“foodstuffs,” but it did not limit the scope of other necessary products to
merely foodstuffs, according to the AB.47
Iron and steel industries in China claimed to utilize 70 percent of refractorygrade bauxite.48 Iron and steel were also items that were primarily employed
in downstream production. The panel agreed with this contention, stating
that refractory-grade bauxite was “important” to China under Article XI: 2 of
the Agreement (a).49 Despite the fact that the action was “necessary”, it was
neither “temporary” nor “intended to prevent a critical shortage”. For these
reasons, the AB affirmed the Panel’s finding that China failed to show that its
refractory-grade bauxite export quota was “temporarily applied”, as defined
by Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994, to either avert or relieve a “critical
shortage.”50
d.

Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994

GATT Article XX(b) was then invoked by China, which stated that export
limitations were principally aimed at reducing dangers to human, animal, and
plant life and health.51 China claimed that scrapping limitations would boost
domestic supply, facilitating a shift in Chinese finished product manufacturing
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid., para. 7.261–63.
Ibid., para. 7.275–76.
China AB Report, para. 326.
China Panel Report, para. 7.313
Ibid., para. 7.340.
China AB Report, para. 344.
China Panel Report, para. 7.470-71.
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from primary resources (extracted minerals) to secondary materials (scraps).52
China also claimed that imposing mineral export restrictions was part of
its environmental policy aimed at safeguarding the lives and health of its
citizens.53
The Panel looked into whether these limits fell within the framework of
policies aimed at protecting human, animal, and plant life and health.54 They
looked at the form and design of restrictions with a degree of deference to
Members’ policies aimed at “protecting human, animal, or plant life or health.”55
The second test was to see if these constraints were “necessary” to achieve the
stated policy objectives.56 The Panel defined three characteristics for Brazil
– Retreaded Tyres, namely “the importance of the interests or values at issue;
the extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure’s aim; and
the measure’s trade restrictiveness.”57 The restriction must then be validated
by comparing it to possible alternatives suggested by the complainants, if a
preliminary determination that it is essential exists.58
After reviewing some of China’s legislation and regulations, the Panel
decided that they did not touch on health or environmental issues.59 The Panel
looked through China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection
(2006-2010) and found no mention of export limitations on raw materials
having the purpose of decreasing pollution caused by their manufacturing
and thereby enhancing public health.60 There was also no mention of export
restrictions in general in the Plan.61 As a result, export restrictions did not
contribute to or form part of a cohesive strategy for meeting the government’s
stated environmental goals.62
The Panel highlighted various measures, such as incentive schemes,
research grants, labeling, and recycling laws, that have been employed in
industrialized nations to promote the development of the secondary industry
when assessing possible alternative measures.63 The Panel discovered that
China was implementing recycling infrastructure measures to help the scrap
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.,para. 7.479.
Ibid.
Ibid., para. 7.480.
Ibid., para. 7.481.
Ibid., para. 7.489.
Ibid., para. 7.501.
Ibid.
Ibid., para. 7.501.
Ibid., para. 7.512.
Ibid., para. 7.610.
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supply grow faster.64 As a result, the Panel determined that China’s export
limitations did not come within the spectrum of policies aimed at protecting
human, animal, or plant life or health, and that they were not “necessary” to
address these health or environmental concerns, and hence were not justified
under Article XX (b). 65

B. CHINA – MEASURES RELATED TO THE EXPORTATION
OF RARE EARTHS, TUNGSTEN, AND MOLYBDENUM
China imposed export levies and quotas on certain rare earth elements,
tungsten, and molybdenum in 2012, reinforcing its export restrictions.66Based
on Article XX(b), China maintained that they were required to preserve human
and animal life and health from the damaging impacts of such mining.67
Furthermore, they were justified under Article XX(g) since they “relate to the
conservation of finite natural resources” and are “implemented in combination
with domestic production or consumption limits.”68 China broke its promises
under paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol and GATT Article XI:1.4,
according to the EU, Japan, and the US, who filed a lawsuit with the WTO.69
China claimed that rare earth, tungsten, and molybdenum mining and
production harmed the environment and, as a result, the health of the Chinese
people, plants, and animals.70 According to Article XX(b), export limitations
were necessary to prevent these environmental and health problems from the
harmful effects of such mining.
Similar to China – Raw Materials, the Panel considered whether export
limitations fell within the framework of regulations aimed at protecting
human, animal, or plant life or health when examining a defense under Article
XX(b).71 The next criterion was whether the measure was “necessary” to
achieve the policy goal, which was determined by weighing four factors:
the importance of the interests or values at stake, the degree of contribution
to the measure’s goal, its trade restrictiveness, and the existence of possible
Ibid.
Ibid., para. 7.611.
66
Panel Report, “China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum,” adopted 29 August 2014, WT/DS431/R; WT/DS432/R; WT/DS433/R, Accessed 18 November
2021, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds431_e.htm [hereinafter China 2 Panel Report]
67
Ibid., para. 7.49-7.114.
68
Ibid., para.7236.
69
Appellate Body Report, “China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and
Molybdenum,” adopted 29 August 2014, WT/DS431/AB/R; WT/DS432/AB/R; WT/DS433/AB/R, Accessed 19 November 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/431_432_433abr_e.pdf [hereinafter China 2 AB Report]
70
China 2 Panel Report, para. 7149
71
Ibid., para. 7144.
64
65
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alternative measures proposed by the complainants.72
The Panel agreed that rare earth, tungsten, and molybdenum mining and
production have harmed the environment, as well as the lives and health
of humans, plants, and animals in China.73 However, the Panel found no
meaningful evidence that export limitations were designed and structured to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health, similar to China - Raw Materials.74
After reviewing some of China’s national policies, it became clear that they
mostly contained language emphasizing the importance of limiting the export
of “highly polluting, highly energy-consuming, and resource-intensive”
products without specifying whether and how such a restriction would help
reduce pollution as part of a comprehensive environmental policy.75
Because China has failed to show that these limits are “essential” to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health, the Panel may not be required to weigh
in on recommended alternatives.76 Nonetheless, the Panel decided to look into
the complainants’ alternative proposals.77 The EU demonstrated that China
had used “complimentary measures” to achieve its goal of environmental
protection, such as complying with the Emission Standards of Pollutants from
Rare Earths Industry and requiring mines to build an ecological recovery
deposit.78 These initiatives eventually made a “substantial contribution” to
China’s health and environment protection.79

III. EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON COVID 19 VACCINES
A. HOW AND WHY THESE RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED
The phrase “vaccine nationalism” was introduced during the development
of the COVID-19 vaccine to describe some countries’ efforts to get the vaccine
for their own populations.80 The UK is expected to get 90 million doses of two
vaccine candidates from a partnership between Pfizer Inc and BioNTech, as
well as the French company Valneva on 20 July 2020.81 If the vaccination
Ibid., para. 7146
Ibid., para. 7156
74
Ibid., para. 7171
75
Ibid., para. 7166
76
Ibid., para. 7181.
77
Ibid., para. 7182.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Ana Santos Rutschman, “The COVID-19 Vaccine Race: Intellectual Property, Collaboration(s), Nationalism and Misinformation,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 64 (2021) [hereinafter Ana
Santos Rutschman, “The COVID-19 Vaccine Race”]: 167.
81
Joanna Patridge, “Government to develop £100m Covid-19 vaccine manufacturing centre,” Accessed
17 October 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/23/government-to-develop-100m-covid72
73
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proves to be effective, an additional 40 million doses will be purchased.
Earlier this year, the UK secured 100 million doses of AstraZeneca’s vaccine,
bringing the total number of doses sold in the UK to 230 million as of July
26, 2020. 82
On 29 January 2021, the EU passed Regulation 2021/111, requiring an
export permit for vaccines against SARS-related corona viruses, as well as
active substances such as master and working cell banks used in vaccine
production.83 An export authorization will only be provided if the amount of
shipments does not pose a threat to the execution of the Union Advanced
Purchased Agreements with vaccine manufacturers.84 The EU claimed that the
restrictions were merely transitory in its explanation.85 Furthermore, in March
2021, Italy halted the export of 250,000 AstraZeneca (AZ) vaccinations to
Australia. The main point presented was that AZ had caused supply shortages
and delays in the EU and Italy.86
Similarly, India also imposed restrictions on these exports as a result of
the major COVID-19 outbreak that has decimated the country.87 Despite prior
agreements and contracts with international customers, the government is
banning COVID-19 vaccine exports due to the vaccine’s essential necessity.
88
Finally, on the basis of the Defense Production Act (DPA), the US has set
limits on the export of critical raw materials used in the creation of COVID-19
vaccines, prioritizing domestic production and usage of COVID-19
vaccinations and personal protective equipment.89 The DPA clearly states that
the domestic industrial base’s ability to “provide products and services for
national defense and to prepare for and respond to military conflicts, natural or
man-made disasters, or acts of terrorism” is critical to the country’s security.90
The concern that wealthy nations may hoard and/or purchase all available
pandemic vaccinations is not new. During the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1)
pandemic, all vaccines on the market were depleted, with the proceeds
going to affluent nations.91 Following the World Health Organization’s call
19-vaccine-manufacturing-centre.
82
Ibid.
83
Ana Santos Rutschman, “The COVID-19 Vaccine Race,” 168.
84
Ibid.
85
“Coronovirus: WHO criticises EU”]
86
Benjamin Mueller and Matina Stevis-Gridneff, “Desperate Italy blocks exports of vaccines bound for Australia,” Accessed 22 November 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/04/world/europe/Covid-AstraZenecavaccines-Europe.html. [hereinafter “Desperate Italy blocks exports of vaccines.”]
87
Sara Jerving, “Countries May Stall COVID-19 Vaccinations.”
88
Ibid.
89
Anshu Siripurapu, “What Is the Defense Production Act.”
90
Ibid.
91
Godwell Nhamo, et. al., “COVID-19 vaccines and treatments nationalism,” 321.
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for donations, The US, Australia, Canada, and six other countries agreed to
donate 10 percent of their vaccine stockpiles to poorer countries, but only after
establishing that their remaining supplies would meet domestic needs.92
Due to these constraints, there is a considerably unequal distribution of
COVID-19 vaccines in least-developed and developing countries. The US,
the UK, and the EU had stated 1,392,249 (44 percent) of all 3,192,782 global
fatalities as of 1 May 2021, despite accounting for only ten percent of the
world’s population of 7.67 billion people – owing to an older population than
less-resourced countries.93 In the most basic scenario of very limited vaccine
supply, less fortunate countries do not have enough doses to vaccinate even
the most high-risk populations, including health-care workers and vulnerable
elderly, who make up 1–10 percent of the population, according to the WHO.94
The researchers noted that by the end of May 2021, the entire African continent
has received fewer than two percent of all doses provided worldwide. 95
For both ethical and pragmatic reasons, vaccine disparity is becoming a
more prominent topic in public health debates. First and foremost, everyone’s
fundamental human right to health requires access to vital medications and
immunizations.96 Pandemics then strike in waves, wreaking havoc on health
systems, notably in developing and least-developed countries.97 Finally, the
longer a pandemic virus spreads throughout the world, the greater the chance
of more transmissible or virulent variations emerging, which might evade
present vaccine formulations and put global health at risk.98

B. ARE EXPORT RESTRICTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE
WTO LAW?
After explaining how and why export restrictions get underway, this
section examines whether these kinds of measures are consistent with the
WTO Law by looking at previous judicial decisions. Referring to China –
Raw Materials, there are three crucial terms in assessing the justification of
Thomas J. Bollyky and Chad P. Bown. “The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism: Only Cooperation Can
End the Pandemic,” Foreign Affairs, Accessed 29 November 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-27/vaccine-nationalism-pandemic
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and Setlhalogile, “The Political Economy of Global Vaccine Nationalism.”]
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imposing COVID-19 vaccines, namely whether the measures are “temporarily
applied”, “to prevent or relieve critical shortages”, and “foodstuffs or other
essential products”.
Under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994, the AB defined “temporary”
as”[l]asting or meant to last for a limited time only; not permanent; made
or arranged to supply a passing need”.99 Temporary measures are always
the reason behind these restrictions. The EU, for example, imposed export
permit for COVID-19 vaccines to reassure that the number of exports will
not adversely affect the domestic need.100 It goes on to say that this permit is
only temporary, and that after the vaccination has been extensively distributed
within its jurisdiction, the export permit will no longer be required. The
restrictions imposed by developed countries may no longer be applied if the
vaccine was evenly distributed and more people were getting vaccinated.
Therefore, it will likely be qualified as “last for a limited time only or not
permanent” following the AB interpretation in China – Raw Materials.
Assessing the term “critical shortage”, the AB explained that it referred
to “those deficiencies in quantity that are crucial, that amount to a situation
of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or
a turning point”.101 The COVID-19 disease, which is caused by the SARSCoV-2 virus, has a high infectivity rate among humans. COVID-19 illness
has infected nearly every continent, resulting in approximately twenty-seven
million infections and over ninety thousand documented deaths.102 The elderly
are also more vulnerable to this condition. In comparison to individuals under
60 years old, the time from commencement of illness to death is shorter in
older patients, especially those over 60 years old.103
Referring to the above nature of this disease, vaccines are the best way to
end this pandemic and its shortage can lead to more people getting infected and
even death. The following countries’ experience with the virus have seen it take
away many of their citizens’ lives. For instance, the outbreak of COVID-19 in
Italy forced its government to block the export of 250,000 vaccines produced
by AZ to Australia.104 The “second wave” outbreak in India resulted in the
government stopping vaccine exports due to the country’s critical need for the
China AB Report, para. 324.
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101
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102
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vaccine.105 As a result, those countries experienced the effects of the outbreak
and the cause of this situation, to some extent, is related to the shortage of
vaccines. Therefore, the export restriction on COVID-19 vaccine will likely
satisfy the meaning of “critical shortage” according to Article XI:2(a) of the
GATT.
Regarding the term “essential to”, the Panel in China – Raw Materials,
concluded that a product may be qualified as “essential” under Article XI:2(a)
if it was “important”, “necessary”, or “indispensable” to a certain Member.106
In this context, COVID-19 vaccines could be a necessity for countries who
are affected by the virus outbreak. Export restrictions are justifiable because
vaccines are absolutely necessary or “indispensable” to save the lives of their
citizens. In other words, nothing is more important than the safety of citizens.
Export restrictions will also satisfy the requirement of general exception
under Article XX of the GATT. Specifically, referring to Article XX (b),
export restrictions on vaccines will be mainly aimed at reducing dangers to
human, animal, and plant life and health.107 Three factors must be considered
when determining if the restrictions are “necessary,” such as “the relevance of
the interests or values at issue, the extent of the contribution to the measure’s
goal, and the measure’s trade restrictiveness”.108 The constraint must then be
validated by comparing it to other feasible measures.109
COVID-19 is a highly infectious disease that has spread rapidly around
the world. The death toll skyrocketed when it first broke out. Patients who
contracted the virus may experience long-term lung impairment if they
survive.110In addition to that, some people who had severe COVID-19
experience a cytokine storm, which is a type of cytokine release syndrome.111
When further examined, many people lost their jobs and money as a result
of the COVID-19 outbreak, which affected basic requirements like food and
housing. Furthermore, the death of loved ones can amplify the impacts of dread
and resource depletion.112 Therefore, a COVID-19 vaccine is arguably the best
option for halting the pandemic, and vaccinations are especially important
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107
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for front-line health care professionals and other vulnerable segments of the
public who are at increased risk.113 Referring to Article XX (b), the policy to
limit the export of COVID-19 vaccine will be mostly aimed at reducing the
danger to humans and health.
Apart from minimizing the impact of the virus, export restrictions
on vaccines will most likely be “necessary” following Article XX (b) of the
GATT. Limiting the export of vaccines for saving the lives of the people within
its territory is undeniable in the current pandemic. This will also provide
significant contribution to end the critical shortage of the vaccine in order to
control the spread of the virus. Finally, for developing countries like India,
there will be no available alternative measures other than export restrictions
to secure the supply of the vaccine for the most vulnerable community within
its territory.

IV. WHAT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN DO?
The fact that export restrictions on COVID-19 vaccines will most likely
be justified under Article XI:2 and XX of the GATT have discouraged least
developed and developing countries to bring this measure before the WTO
settlement body. Nevertheless, there are other available alternative measures
to respond to these restrictions. Compulsory licensing and security exceptions
under the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) are two options for dealing with
COVID-19 vaccine export restrictions.

A. COMPULSORY LICENSING
When a government forces someone other than the patent holder to
produce a patented product without the patent holder’s approval, this is
known as compulsory licensing.114 Compulsory licensing is a legal tool that
developing countries can utilize to protect public health in the event of a
national emergency or for public non-commercial use.115 Most least-developed
and developing countries, on the other hand, have not imposed compulsory
licensing.116
Marco Ciotti, et.al., “The COVID-19 pandemic,” Critical Reviews in Clinical Laboratory Sciences 57
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115
Ibid.
116
Ibid
113

277

I Gusti Ngurah Parikesit Widiatedja

Article 31 of TRIPs deals with “use without the right holder’s authorization”
or the compulsory license. According to Article 31(b), the license may only be
used if the potential user has first attempted to get authorization from the rights
holder “on reasonable commercial terms and conditions” and such attempts
have failed within a reasonable time. There is no definition of “acceptable
business terms and conditions” in Article 31.117 It further states that in times of
national emergency or other severe urgency, the previous need of first asking
permission from the rights holder may be removed.118 According to Article
31(f), a compulsory license must be used predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the country issuing the license. Nevertheless, a country
that lacks drug-manufacturing capacity may import compulsorily licensed
pharmaceuticals from another country”, according to Article 31bis of the
TRIPS Agreement.
The identified attempts were examined at pharmaceutical, national, and
claimant levels, as well as the consequences of the attempts. Since 1995, 108
attempts to obtain compulsory licensing for 40 medications have been made
in 27 countries.119 The majority of the efforts took place in Latin American,
African and Asian countries, and were mostly for HIV/AIDS medications.120
Furthermore, the likelihood of approval and positive results increased when
the claimant was the government.121 Compulsory licensing has since become
a practical strategy in a number of Asian and Latin American countries, even
for non-HIV/AIDS drugs.122
In the current pandemic, India and South Africa have submitted an
application to the TRIPS Council for a waiver of certain TRIPS restrictions.
They cited reports of intellectual property rights obstructing or potentially
obstructing the timely delivery of affordable medical items to patients.123
They criticized, in particular, the time-consuming and inefficient process for
importing and exporting pharmaceutical products under Article 31bis.124 They
asked the TRIPS Council to approve a waiver of sections 1, 4, 5, and 7 of Part
II of the TRIPS Agreement in connection to COVID-19, which would be in
William N. Monte, “Compulsory licensing of patents,” Information & Communications Technology
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effect until universal immunization was in place and the majority of the world’s
population had obtained immunity.125 When the proposal was first presented, it
was backed by a number of developing countries, including China.126
Pharmaceutical corporations and politicians, including German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, have been vocal in their opposition to the waiver plan. Merkel
claimed that “production capacities and high-quality standards, not patents,”
were the limiting constraints in vaccine availability, and that intellectual
property protection “is a source of innovation and must remain so in the
future.”127 Vaccine manufacturers have argued that lifting patent protections
will stifle risk-taking and innovation.128
Unlike the European Parliament, some EU countries, such as Spain,
supported the waiver, while others remained open to dialogue and persuasion.129
According to a joint piece by many world leaders, such as France’s Emmanuel
Macron, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, and
Senegal’s Macky Sall, the key to combating future pandemics is passing not
only licenses, but also experience to developing nations’ vaccine producers.130
The U.S also supports the South African and Indian proposal within the WTO.
Katherine Tai, the US Trade Representative, revealed the US’ position in early
May 2021, “For the sake of ending this pandemic, the US Trade Representative
stated that global health and extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic
requires extreme actions, such as waiving protections under the TRIPs for
COVID-19 vaccinations.”131

B. NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
The original GATT 1947 included a broad definition of national security.
This kind of exception was incorporated into the current WTO. The exception
allows a contracting party to take “any action it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests”, despite other commitments
if certain conditions are met.132 Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994 and
Article 73(b) of the TRIPs are considered to be the key to national security
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exception. It provides that nothing in this Agreement is intended to prevent
any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary to
protect its essential security interests:
“(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and
to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”
In other words, Section (b) of those agreements lays out three scenarios in
which a member state may take “action” to restrict trade if it is “necessary” to
protect its “essential security interests”. These include “fissionable material”,
“arms... and other materials...for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment”, and “war or other emergency”. This section’s substantive
content is relatively open-textured.133 No further definitions of ambiguous
terms such as “necessary”, “essential”, “security interests”, or “emergency”
are provided in Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 73(b) of the
TRIPs.
WTO members can use this kind of exception to justify their noncompliance with the GATT 1994 and TRIPs. This type of guarantee is
necessary to preserve their vital security interests, confirming the principle
of territoriality in international commerce law and international intellectual
property law in general. 134 Concerning the pandemic, members could employ
Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPs to justify measures that suspend intellectual
property rights protection and enforcement in order to facilitate the purchase,
importation, or production of diagnostics, vaccines, and medicines needed to
combat the COVID-19 pandemic.135
Under the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO, both panels and
the Appellate Body (AB) were rarely invoked and even less frequently decided
cases concerning the national security exception. They had not reasoned the
range of the national security exception authoritatively. However, in 2019
and 2020, there were two panel reports interpreting the range of security
exceptions, namely Russia-Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, and
Ibid.
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to Intellectual Property,” Virginia Journal of International Law 46, no. 2 (2006): 366. See also Emmanuel
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Saudi Arabia-Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights. These two reports were the basis for a nascent national security trade
jurisprudence.136
In Russia-Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, due to political tensions
with Ukraine, Russia limited international transit freight by road and rail from
Ukraine headed for Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic, and prohibited such
transit cargo for specific kinds of commodities.137 Ukraine alleged that the
transit limitations breached Article V(2) of the GATT 1994, which ensures
“freedom of transit” via the territory of other signatory countries.138 Russia
employed Article XXI(b) (iii) of the GATT 1994, claiming that the panel
lacked authority to consider the national security exemption.139 In other words,
Russia claimed that Article XXI was self-contained.140
The panel dismissed Russia’s claims after reviewing the provision’s
wording, object and purpose, and negotiation history.141 Firstly, it determined
that the chapeau of Article XXI(b) was self-contained; the “which it considers”
wording in the chapeau, which was relied on for the non-justifiably argument,
does not apply to the listing of particular instance included in sub-paragraphs
(i)-(iii). The wording of each sub-paragraph “relating to” for (i) and (ii) and
“taken at the time of” for (iii) supports the claim that they reflect an objective
relationship rather than a subjective determination.142 As a result, the panels
have the authority to review Article XXI invocations.143
After determining that the invocation of Article XXI(b) was justifiable, the
panel considered the substance of Russia’s claim. The panel differed between
the chapeau of Article XXI(b) (“necessary for the safeguarding of its essential
security interests”) and the language of Article XXI(b) (iii) (“taken in time of
war or other emergency”). The panel determined that the existence of “war or
other emergency” was an objective question.144 Article XXI(b), on the other
hand, leaves it to “any member to determine what it regards to be its core
security interests,” subject to the condition that such evaluation be undertaken
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137
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in good faith.145 As a result, the identified security interest must be “essential”
and cannot be utilized to avoid the state’s commitments under GATT 1994.
In this case, the Panel determined that, given the nature of the international
emergency, which is extremely near to the “hard core” of war or armed
conflict, Russia’s articulation of its basic security interests cannot be regarded
opaque or indefinite.146 Furthermore, the measures were related to the 2014
political emergency that it is improbable that Russia took action to preserve
its vital security interests as a result of that emergency.147 As a result, and in
accordance with the adjectival word “which it considers” in the chapeau of
Art. XXI(b), the Panel determined that the Russian Federation satisfied the
criteria for invoking Art. XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994.148
In Saudi Arabia - Intellectual Property Rights, the panel reviewed the
legitimacy of Saudi Arabia’s sanctions against some Qatari stations under
the TRIPS.149Prior to the challenged measures, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
were involved in a diplomatic conflict, which resulted in Saudi Arabia and
many other states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt,
cutting ties with Qatar.150 Soon after Qatar responded to Saudi Arabia began
implementing a system of coercive economic measures against Qatar by
allowing pirating of sports broadcasts licensed to Qatari companies..151 It
also fined Saudi attorneys who defended Qatari nationals.152 Saudi Arabia
responded by citing the security exemption in TRIPS Article 73(b), claiming
that its actions were permissible because they were required to preserve Saudi
Arabia’s essential security interests.153
The panel employed the same analytical framework as the Russia – Traffic
in Transit panel.154 Applying this scheme, the panel determined that, first and
foremost, the severance of all diplomatic and economic ties between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar constituted “the ultimate State expression of the existence
of an emergency in international relations,”155 and that Saudi Arabia’s action
occurred during that ongoing emergency.156 Hence, the Panel concluded
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147
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that Saudi Arabia had met the requirements for invoking article 73(b)(iii) of
the TRIPs, but not in relation to Saudi Arabia’s non-application of criminal
procedures of piracy and penalties to attorneys.157
Referring to article 73(b) of the TRIPs and the previous WTO judicial
decisions, developing countries may impose security exceptions to suspend
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights for facilitating
the availability of COVID-19 vaccines. As stated in Russia-Traffic in Transit,
this article enables WTO members to determine what it regards to be its
core security interests as long as it is undertaken in good faith and it is not
employed to avoid members’ commitments under the GATT 1994. Hence,
some developing countries can impose this kind of exception on the basis to
protect their essential security interests taken in this pandemic era, that may be
within the meaning of “other emergency in international relations” as stated
in Article 73(b) (iii).
However, while it is feasible, at least in theory, scholars have argued that
the application of the security exception under Article 73(b) of the TRIPS
Agreement is not a realistic option.158 Only governments with the capacity
to manufacture pharmaceutical items domestically can potentially claim this
measure to justify suspending patent protection and enforcement to preserve
their essential security interests.159 Under the waiver criteria, proposed
countries must notify the WTO of their plan to import and must adhere to a
set of complex requirements designed to protect patent holders’ interests.160
Measures to prevent drugs from being re-exported to more affluent countries
are among them (presumably at a profit).161 Given these circumstances, it is no
wonder that just one notice has been filed under the TRIPs waiver of 2001—
for Canada to supply Rwanda with the second-line HIV medicine TriAvir. 162
Although these two options require difficult requirements, developing
countries such as India and South Africa have shown that they must continue
to strive for compulsory licensing and security exceptions under the TRIPs.
The WTO, along with developed countries, should put the equal distribution
of vaccines as a main priority. The availability of vaccines in some
Ibid. para. 7.286.
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underdeveloped countries is still not sufficient. With this gap still in place,
the goal of ending this pandemic will be delayed.. It is possible that some
countries with a shortage of vaccines will experience viral mutations that
cannot be overcome by currently available vaccines. When that happens, the
act of securing vaccines for domestic purposes, which is usually undertaken
by developed countries, could be a boomerang for efforts to end the pandemic
that has lasted for 2 years.

V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on the global economy
and trade, since output and consumption have been curtailed globally. Due
to several wealthy countries imposing export restrictions, the manufacture
and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines resulted in unequal distribution. As a
result, while wealthier countries are returning to normalcy, the rest of the world
struggles to vaccinate its citizens. Article XI(2)(a) of the GATT exclusions
gives members the legal authority to impose temporary export restrictions
on foodstuffs and vital products that are applied in the context of preventing
and alleviating critical shortages. Export restrictions on COVID-19 vaccines
imposed by industrialized countries appear to fit these criteria, given that all
of these countries are experiencing a scarcity and the limitations are imposed
to remedy the shortage. To protest the unequal vaccine distribution around the
world, this paper concludes that developing countries may use two alternative
mechanisms, namely compulsory licensing and security exceptions under the
GATT 1994 and the TRIPs. Nonetheless, this paper recognizes that these two
mechanisms are only possible if those countries develop and improve their
vaccine manufacturing capacity.
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